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United States v. Johnson, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
27042 (1st Cir. 2006).
Jonathan Lew, 3L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
The United States filed a civil action against the
Johnsons for allegedly discharging pollutants
into federally-regulated waters without a permit
in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA).1 The
Johnsons are the owners of three parcels of land
that contain wetlands which are connected to
the Weweantic River through various streams,
ponds, channels, and ditches. Between 1979 and
1999, the Johnsons have discharged dredged
and fill material at these sites in order to con-
struct, expand, and maintain their cranberry
bogs. The district court held that there was a
sufficient basis for the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ cranberry farms
and the Johnsons appealed to the First Circuit.
The First Circuit held the appeal in abeyance
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court issued a split
decision vacating the Sixth Circuit’s decision
which attempted to interpret the phrase “waters
of the United States” as found in the CWA. The
plurality, which consists of Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts,
International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette,
2006 Alas. LEXIS 127 (Alaska Sept. 1, 2006). 
Britta Hinrichsen, 3L, Vermont Law School
In International Seafoods of Alaska v. Bissonette,
the Alaska Supreme Court addressed a breach
of contract claim by commercial salmon fishers
from Bristol Bay against a seafood company for
paying a price lower than promised. On whole,
the court determined that the fishers met the
requirements to file a class action, the trial
court properly sanctioned fishers who did not
respond to discovery requests, one jury verdict
could be given for the entire class, jury instruc-
tion was proper, and the lower court did not
abuse its discretion for increasing the award for
attorney’s fees.
Background
Buyers of red salmon in Bristol Bay usually pay a
“posted price” when salmon are delivered, while
big buyers, such as Trident, Peter Pan, or Icicle,
pay a higher “bay price” later in the season.1 It is
accepted practice for smaller Bristol Bay buyers
to pay a “retro” bonus at the end of the season to
adjust for the difference between the posted
See Rapanos, page 18
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Safety Zones; U.S. Coast Guard Water Training
Areas, Great Lakes, 72 Fed. Reg. 520 (Jan. 5,
2007). 
Terra Bowling, J.D.
On January 5, the Coast Guard (CG) withdrew
its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
involving the establishment of safety zones
throughout the Great Lakes and the restriction
of vessels during live fire gun exercises.
Although the Coast Guard is authorized to
conduct such training exercises in, on, and
over the waters of the United States, public
concerns over the exercises prompted with-
drawal of the notice. 
Public Comment
On August 1, 2006, the Coast Guard issued the
NPRM, which outlined thirty-four safety zones
located three nautical miles from the shoreline
of the Great Lakes. The proposal included per-
manent safety zones “to provide the public
with more notice and predictability when con-
ducting infrequent periodic training exercises
of brief duration …”
The NPRM provided a period for public
comment until August 31; however, due to
strong public interest, the Coast Guard
extended the opportunity for public comment.
Comments came from a variety of sources,
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Jessica Barkas
For the past year, I’ve been part of the
National Observer Program (NOP), a part of
the Office of Science and Technology at
NMFS. Fisheries observers are required in
several United States commercial fisheries.
They sample catch and bycatch and record
interactions with protected species, such as
sea turtles, marine mammals, and seabirds.
The NOP facilitates communication and
cooperation between the fisheries observer
programs in each of the six NMFS regions
and coordinates the resolution of issues and
problems that affect the observer program on
a national scale. 
A major project during my time with the
NOP has been initiating work on the
National Bycatch Report. The definition of
bycatch has several technical variations, but
in short, it is that proportion of the catch that
is typically “thrown back,” including fish
that are of little market value due to size or
species, and other species that may not be
retained, such as sea turtles, marine mam-
mals, or sea birds. Catch of non-target species
is undesirable because it wastes marine
resources and injures and kills protected
species. The report will bring together
bycatch data on finfish, marine mammals, sea
turtles, and seabirds from each of the NMFS
regions to produce national estimates of com-
mercial fisheries bycatch and serve as a yard-
stick to help measure NMFS’s success over
time at reducing bycatch. Much of my work
on the report has been drafting some of the
introductory sections and helping to assem-
ble data and other information in support of
Meredith Mendelson
In my year as a Knauss Sea Grant Fellow in
the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
Management (OCRM) at NOAA, I have had
several wonderful experiences. I work with
incredibly bright, passionate people who take
creative approaches to solving traditional
management problems. Under the authority
of the Coastal Zone Management Act, our
office works in partnership with the state
coastal programs and National Estuarine
Research Reserves. That cooperative aspect
really sets OCRM apart from other offices
and requires us to be responsive and flexible
to the needs and interests of our partners.
The greatest challenge, for me, has been to
understand the complexity of the interactions
between the various levels of government,
and to learn to respond to the needs of local
and state governments while maintaining a
national perspective. I consider myself espe-
cially lucky to have had the opportunity to
participate in several truly innovative, locally-
driven projects. 
My work has focused on the Portfields
Initiative, a federal port revitalization pro-
gram focusing on environmentally and eco-
nomically sustainable redevelopment, recent-
ly implemented on a regional scale for the
first time in southeastern Louisiana. The
importance of the Lower Mississippi River
ports to our national security and economy
cannot be underestimated. We held a large
kickoff meeting in New Orleans in May, 2006,
with eleven federal and six state agencies rep-
resented, several local partners and the six
participating ports. 
See Mendelson, page 10 See Barkas, page 10
Bilyeu v. Ocean City, 2006 U.S. App LEXIS
24881 (3rd Cir. Oct. 2, 2006).
Madeline Bush, 2L, Vermont Law School
On September 11, 1999, Jeffrey Bilyeu
drowned off the coast of Ocean City, New
Jersey’s 30th Street Beach. Danette Bilyeu,
Jeffrey’s wife, brought claims against the city
for the wrongful death of her husband. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the city, finding that it was immune
from suit under the New Jersey Tort Claims
Act (NJTCA).
Background
On the day of the accident, Jeffrey had been
swimming in shallow waters with the Bilyeus’
son, Matthew, when a powerful rip current
washed the child from shore. Jeffrey made an
effort to save his son; however, Jeffrey became
trapped in the strong current. Danette was
able to pull Matthew from the dangerous
waters, but was unable to reach her husband.
No lifeguards were on duty, so by the time life-
guards from a nearby beach reached Jeffrey, he
could not be resuscitated. Danette filed suit,
alleging that Ocean City’s “negligent super-
vision” and “failure to warn” were the cause
of her husband’s death. 
Immunity from Suit
Prior to the Bilyeu family’s misfortune, Ocean
City had implemented a beach nourishment
program that dredged millions of cubic yards of
sediment from the ocean and repositioned it
closer to shore. The NJTCA gives immunity to
public entities for “an injury caused by a con-
dition of any unimproved public property,
including but not limited to any natural condi-
tion of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.”1
Immunity from such suits is an essential pro-
tective measure not only for the public entity,
but also for the general public. Besides the costs
associated with defending claims arising from
injury on unimproved property, establishing
safe unimproved property would be far too
demanding for a public entity to manage.
Without the immunity claim, the public may
not have access to unimproved public property
like Ocean City’s 30th Street Beach. 
In light of these policy considerations, the
New Jersey Supreme Court liberally interprets
the term “unimproved.” The court determined
that a property is improved if it undergoes a
“substantial physical modification from its nat-
ural state,” and if the physical modification
creates a hazard that “did not previously exist
and which requires management by the public
entity.”2 The court concluded that if all of the
facts supported that the beach is unimproved
property, then the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Ocean City should
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common to nature” 
is generally still found 
to be in its 
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under NJTCA.
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be upheld. If the facts alleged demonstrated
that there is a “genuine issue of material fact,”
then the district court erred in granting the
summary judgment.3
An oceanography expert testified that
“Ocean City’s beach nourishment program sub-
stantially modified the natural state of the
beach,” producing sandbars that are more favor-
able to rip current formation.4 The expert also
reported that the “dangerous condition” of the
rip current on the 30th Street Beach was a result
of the nourishment program.5 However, he also
testified that the sandbars resulting from the
nourishment program were “likely” present at
the 30th Street Beach before it eroded.6
The court concluded that the beach quali-
fied as unimproved property. First, the court
noted that a natural condition physically modi-
fied to “duplicate models common to nature” is
generally still found to be in its “natural condi-
tion” under NJTCA. The oceanography expert
stated that sandbars are natural features of the
beach that would be present before the nour-
ishment program
became effective.
The court rea-
soned that the
nourishment pro-
gram is only du-
plicating a natur-
al process and
thus could not be
a physical modi-
fication from its
natural state. Fur-
ther, even if a
physical modifi-
cation existed, the
court found no
evidence that the
nourishment pro-
gram created a
hazard that was
not already in
existence at the
30th Street Beach.
Hence, the risk
was previously present. The expert testimony
only offered the mere possibility the risk was
not present, not a probability. 
Conclusion 
After examining the application of NJTCA to
the wrongful death claim and holding that the
property was “unimproved,” the court of
appeals affirmed the district court’s decision
to grant a summary judgment in favor of
Ocean City.
Endnotes
1.  Bilyeu v. Ocean City, 2006 U.S. App LEXIS
24881 at *5 (3rd Cir. Oct. 2, 2006).
2.  Id. at *6-7 (citations omitted).
3.  Id. at *3.
4. Id. at *8.
5.  Id. at *9.
6.  Id.
Photograph of beach and sand dunes courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
Diamond v. State, 2006 Haw. LEXIS 559 (Haw.
Oct. 24, 2006).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
Two Hawaiian residents contested a property
owner’s shoreline certification that had been
based on artificially introduced vegetation and
resulted in the shoreline moving closer to the
ocean, possibly restricting public access and
contributing to beach erosion. In October, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled in favor of the
residents, confirming the correct definition of
“shoreline” for construction setback purposes.
Background 
In 1999, Carl Stephens purchased an oceanfront
lot in a subdivision on the island of Kauai.
Shortly after buying the property, Stephens
replaced large false kamani trees along the shore-
line with spider lilies and naupaka and had an
irrigation line installed to water the vegetation. 
Before beginning new construction on
beachfront property in Hawaii, the Department
of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) must
approve a shoreline certification, which county
zoning boards then use to determine the con-
struction setback. Stephens obtained a shoreline
certification from the DLNR placing the shore-
line along the high-water mark; however, the
certification expired before Stephens could
begin construction. 
In a second survey, state inspector Randall
Hashimoto placed the shoreline at the vegeta-
tion line Stephens had planted despite rejecting
the naupaka as a shoreline marker in the first
survey. The new certification placed the shore-
line more than ten feet seaward at some points.
After the shoreline was certified by the
DLNR, Harold Diamond and Caren Bronstein
filed an administrative appeal with the Board of
Land and Natural Resources (BLNR), which
was denied. Diamond and Bronstein appealed
the BLNR’s denial of appeal to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Hawaii. The court affirmed the
BLNR’s order noting that the BLNR had
revised its definition of “shoreline” to reflect the
legislature’s definition. 
Mootness
Prior to June 2006, the Board of Land and
Natural Resources (BLNR) definition of shore-
line contrasted with the Hawaii State Legis-
lature’s definition of shoreline. The legislature
defines shoreline as “the upper reaches of the
wash of the waves … usually evidenced by the
edge of vegetation growth, or the upper limit of
debris left by the wash of the waves.”1 The
BLNR defined shoreline as “the upper reaches
of the wash of the waves … usually evidenced by
the edge of vegetation growth, or where there is
no vegetation in the immediate vicinity, the
upper limit of debris left by the wash of the
waves.”2 The BLNR definition seemed to give a
preference for using the vegetation line for
shoreline certification.
Amid much controversy, the BLNR revised its
definition of shoreline to reflect the wording used
by the legislature. The Hawaii Supreme Court
agreed that the issue of shoreline delineation was
moot, as there were no longer conflicting defini-
tions and the court could not provide an effective
remedy. The court noted, however, that it would
decide moot issues in “cases involving questions
that affect the public interest and are ‘capable of
repetition yet evading review.’”3 In this instance,
the court concluded that the definition of shore-
line was “a matter of vast public importance” and
that future shoreline certification challenges were
likely; therefore, it would rule on the claim
despite its mootness. 
Defining Shoreline
The court found that a previous Hawaii
Supreme Court decision, County of Hawaii v.
Somatura, supported the proposition that “the
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shoreline should be certified at the highest
reach of the highest wash of the waves.”4 In
Somatura, the court held that public policy sup-
ported “extending to public use and ownership
as much of Hawaii’s shoreline as is reasonably
possible.”5 The court also examined legislative
history of HRS § 205A-1 and found that it
favored shoreline certification at the highest
reach of the highest wash of the waves. 
In examining whether to use the vegetation
line or the debris line when determining the
upper reaches of the wash of the waves, the court
examined both the language and the legislative
history of the statute. The court held that there
is no preference for which line to use when
determining the highest reach of the waves, so
long as the line used is the one farthest inland. 
Diamond and Bronstein also raised the
issue of whether a vegetation line that had
been planted and irrigated by property owners
could be used to determine the shoreline. The
BLNR defines vegeta-
tion growth as “any
plant, tree, shrub, grass
or groups, clusters, or
patches of the same,
naturally rooted and
growing.”6 The court
found that, although
the agency’s interpreta-
tion of its rule should
be given weight, it
“encourages private
landowners to plant
and promote salt-tol-
erant vegetation to
extend their land [far-
ther seaward]” and did
not comply with the
legislative purpose of
extending public use
and ownership of the
shoreline.7
Conclusion
The Hawaii Supreme
Court reversed the cir-
cuit court’s ruling and clarified the shoreline
certification process; however, the court’s
decision will not have an effect on Stephens’
property. Prior to the ruling, Stephens sold
the property and the current owner began
construction using the now-defunct shore-
line certification.8
Endnotes
1. HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A-1.
2. HAW. CODE R. § 13-222-2.
3.  Diamond v. State, 2006 Haw. LEXIS 559 at
*29 (Hawaii Oct. 24, 2006).
4.  Id. at *34.
5. Id.
6. HAW. CODE R. § 13-222-2.
7. Diamond, 2006 Haw. LEXIS 559 at *43.
8. http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/
2006/Oct/26/ln/FP610260344.html .
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Fishermen’s Class Action, from page 1
price and the bay price. International Seafoods
of Alaska, Inc. (ISA) followed this practice by
matching the competitive “bay price” set by the
big buyers or by paying “retros.”2
In 1999, ISA leased a competitor’s fishing
facilities on Egegik beach. To alleviate the
fishers’ concerns about ISA’s control of the
fishery in the area, ISA sent a letter to fishers
stating that ISA has “always done things
according to our own costs and sales and . . . to
keep your business we must be competitive
with our price . . . .”3 Fishers interpreted this
language as assurance that ISA would pay the
competitive bay price for salmon in relation to
the other buyers in Bristol Bay. ISA viewed the
language narrowly by only considering its
“own costs and sales” without regard to other
competitors. In 2000, ISA lost money and did
not pay Egegik fishers retro payment above
the posted price. Fishers then filed a class
action against ISA for failing to pay the com-
petitive bay price.
Lower Court
Six fishers filed the breach of contract claim
against ISA, which had to be certified as a class
action. The Alaska Superior Court certified the
class, which totaled 110 members, as “[a]ll fish-
ers, who in the year 2000, took salmon from the
Egegik District and sold these salmon to
International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc.”4 ISA
objected to the certification and requested that
the claims of fishers who did not respond to dis-
covery be dismissed. The court maintained the
certification and held that only evidence pro-
vided in discovery could be used at trial, there-
by limiting witnesses at trial to those plaintiffs
who had responded to discovery requests.5 ISA
also contested the single jury verdict form used
for the entire class, which the court found
Photograph of Alaskan salmon fishermen courtesy of NOAA’s Photo Library, Fisheries Collection.
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appropriate since “that’s the whole point of a
class action.”6 Ultimately, the jury awarded the
fishers an additional $0.17 per pound for
salmon ISA bought in 2000 plus attorney’s fees. 
Alaska Supreme Court
Class Certification
As per Civil Rule 23, plaintiffs may be certified
as a class if
(1) the class is so numerous that join-
der of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.7
The Alaska Supreme Court found that the fish-
ers met these requirements. First, the class was
numerous (110 members) and joinder would be
impractical because the members were “so geo-
graphically dispersed.”8 Second, commonality
exists if “the named plaintiffs share at least one
question of fact or law with the grievances of the
prospective class.”9 All plaintiffs of the class
claimed a breach of contract by ISA and sought
monetary damages for the difference between
the competitive bay price and what ISA paid.
Likewise, plaintiffs also satisfied the third
requirement of typicality—all plaintiffs had the
same claim arising from ISA’s alleged breach of
contract. Finally, the representatives of the class
adequately protected the interests of the class
because all shared the same interests and dam-
ages. Additionally, the court noted that policy
considerations favored a class action suit to
ensure fair, efficient, and consistent adjudica-
tion of each of the fisher’s claims.
Discovery 
The supreme court also found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to severely sanction absent class mem-
bers who did not participate in discovery.
Discovery against absent class members is per-
missible through interrogation when “the dis-
covery sought was relevant to the decision of
common questions and may have been known
only to absent class members.”10 In such cir-
cumstances, the court can compel compliance
with discovery requests by imposing sanctions.
However, the court found that dismissal of the
absent class members’ claims, as ISA requested,
was too severe a sanction. The trial court has
“broad discretion to choose whether to impose
any sanctions at all on the non-responding class
members.”11 The Alaska Supreme Court upheld
the lower court’s decision to exclude testimony
from trial that was not produced during discov-
ery, because ISA failed to demonstrate that the
trial court abused its broad discretion. 
Jury Verdict Form
The court also found that a single jury verdict
form was appropriate for this class action. ISA
contended that it created individual contracts
with each fisher and should have independent
adjudications for each. To take ISA’s position,
however, would result in multiple duplicative
suits.12 Once a court certifies a class, the “class of
plaintiffs is entitled to the same verdict” and
therefore should be given a single verdict form.13
Jury Instruction 
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the jury
instruction regarding salmon purchase price
properly allowed the jury to determine what
price ISA promised to pay each fisher. The
instruction stated that “[ISA] maintains that it
promised to pay all plaintiffs the same price”
and that it was up to the jury to “decide whether
a promise to pay a particular price was made as
See Fishermen’s Class Action, page 22
Given all of the evidence, 
the jury determined that 
ISA promised to pay 
the competitive bay price.
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Barkas, from page 3
Two days were spent identifying priority
projects and applicable financial and technical
assistance opportunities. In recent months, the
ports have applied for many grants with agen-
cies ranging from NOAA and EPA to the
Economic Development Administration and
the Department of Homeland Security. 
The first major success came in September
when five ports received a grant of $11.4 mil-
lion from DHS for layered port security
improvements. 
Portfields represents the federal level
approach to port revitalization, and even
though it requires a great deal of initiative on
the ports’ part, there are some fascinating com-
munity-based efforts underway as well. 
I recently attended a Special Area Man-
agement Plan (SAMP) Neighborhood Plan
implementation workshop in Wilmington,
Delaware. The Delaware coastal program has
been working closely with the community to
bring jobs, better housing and mixed-use devel-
opment back to the area. They are also seeking
to provide public access to the waterfront and
restore several wetlands in the area. 
In Providence, Rhode Island, the Sea Grant
program is also engaging in a SAMP process for
the Metro Bay area. As part of that project,
Rhode Island Sea Grant is considering possible
solutions for redevelopment of the Providence
waterfront. Balancing the marine economy
with the desire to bring mixed-use development
to the waterfront is no small feat, but is a wise
approach to making educated re-zoning deci-
sions. It is certainly inspiring to see the states
and local governments pursuing long-term
strategies for waterfront planning.
the NMFS scientists who will be producing the
bycatch estimates and transforming regional
fisheries observer data, collected for diverse
assessment purposes, into a national estimate
of bycatch. We’ve just completed the first year
of what is presently scheduled to be an approx-
imately two to three year effort.
I’ve also been involved in projects related to
assuring the quality of the data NMFS dissemi-
nates to the public. Under the Data Quality Act,
federal agencies must assure that scientific and
technical information is thoroughly reviewed
before it is released to the public. To this end,
NMFS conducts pre-dissemination review on
all of its scientific products and peer reviews all
of the influential scientific information it pro-
duces. For information that is being peer
reviewed, agencies are required to make peer
review plans available to the public, so that they
might be commented upon. The NOAA peer
review agenda was recently updated, including
many peer review plans from NMFS, and may
be viewed on the website of the NOAA Chief
Information Officer: http://www.cio.noaa.gov/
itmanagement/infoq.htm. As the Acting NMFS
Data Quality Act Coordinator, I had the oppor-
tunity to coordinate the update of the NMFS
peer review plans and to provide my NMFS col-
leagues with general advice on Data Quality Act
compliance.
Finally, in another interesting lesson in fed-
eral administrative practice, I had the opportu-
nity to move a draft proposed rule that intend-
ed to improve fisheries observer health and
safety through the administrative rulemaking
process. The average law school administrative
law class does not really prepare a person for
just how many memos, approvals, assorted
analyses, and revisions go into administrative
rulemaking, even on a set of relatively minor
changes to an existing rule. Nonetheless, the
process has been very instructive, and the rule
should be published in the Federal Register in
the coming weeks.
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Ninth Circuit Finds Rental
Company Had No Duty to Warn
Hodges v. Summer Fun Rentals, Inc., 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25443 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2006).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
district court ruling that wake jumping and
operating a personal watercraft within 200 feet
of another vessel is an open and obvious danger
and that a personal watercraft rental agency had
no duty to warn its customers of the danger. 
Background
Two eighteen-year old friends, Matthew
McAlpine and Mason Hodges, rented Sea Doo
personal watercrafts from Summer Fun Rentals,
located on the Columbia River. Before taking
the crafts onto the river, employees of Summer
Fun instructed the friends on operating the per-
sonal watercrafts, including instructions on the
“kill switch,” to stay out of shallow water, and to
“stay below 5 miles an hour until they hit the
buoy … [and then to] ‘go ahead and do whatev-
er they wanted to do.’”1 The employees did not
give instructions pertaining to wake jumping. 
After about fifty minutes of incident-free
riding on the personal watercrafts (PWCs), the
friends decided to pass a boat coming toward
them and jump in its wake. During the maneu-
ver, Hodges fell off his PWC and McAlpine
crashed into him. As a result of the accident,
Hodges suffered severe injuries, including the
amputation of his leg. 
Photograph courtesy of Marine Photo Bank, © Wolcott Henry 2005.
See Rental Company, page 17
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Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 466
F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).
Allyson L. Vaughn, 3L University of Mississippi
School of Law
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held that when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) makes a “warranted but preclud-
ed” finding under the
Endangered Species
Act (ESA) it must
comply with the
explicit require-
ments provided
by the ESA. 
Background
On February
8, 2000, the
Center for Bio-
logical Diversity
and the Pacific
Rivers Council (col-
lectively, the Center)
petitioned the FWS to list
the Sierra Nevada Moun-
tain Yellow-Legged Frog
(the Frog) as endangered
under the ESA. Approx-
imately eight months later, the FWS published
an initial finding indicating that the Frog may
require listing. After the initial finding, the
FWS began a status review to determine the
appropriateness of listing. The FWS failed to
release its finding within the twelve month
period required by the ESA, and the Center
filed suit in the Northern District of
California. The district court required the
FWS to issue its finding. 
The FWS published its twelve-month find-
ing on January 16, 2003 (the Frog Decision),
which found that listing the Frog was necessary
but “precluded by other higher priority listing
actions.”1 At the time, the highest priority for
the FWS was to comply with court orders and
judicially approved settlements, with all
remaining funds applied to emergency listings
and listings of higher priority species.2 The
FWS listed the Frog as a “candidate” species
for future listing purposes and assigned a
priority ranking of
“three” on the 12-
level scale where
“one” con-
stitutes an
emergency. A
candidate is a
species for
which the FWS
has sufficient
information on
file regarding
the “biological vulner-
ability and threats to support
a proposal … but for which
preparation and publication
of a proposal is precluded by
higher-priority listing actions.”3
The ESA requires a finding of
“warranted but precluded” to be published in
the Federal Register and to include “a descrip-
tion and evaluation of the reasons and data on
which the finding is based.”4 Additionally, the
FWS is required by law to “identify proposals
for other listings that preclude listing the [can-
didate] and to find that procedures are in place
to list qualified species.5 The FWS failed to
meet these requirements; however, the district
court found for the FWS and upheld the “war-
Fish and Wildlife Service Must
Comply with Endangered Species
Act Requirements
Photograph of  Sierra
Nevada Mountain Yellow-
Legged Frog
courtesy of the USGS.
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ranted but precluded” decision because the
path of the FWS could be “reasonably dis-
cerned.”6 The district court based its finding on
the descriptions of listing actions that were pro-
vided in the 2002 Candidate Notice of Review
(CNOR), and the anticipated listed budget for
Fiscal Year 2003, neither of which were pub-
lished with the Frog Decision.
The Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit found that the FWS cannot
make a “warranted but precluded” finding
without publishing a description of its reason-
ing and data with the finding.7 Furthermore,
case law in the Ninth Circuit clearly indicates
that the circumstances under which the “war-
ranted but precluded” finding may be issued are
“narrowly defined.”8 In Center for Biological
Diversity v. Norton, the court held that the FWS
must show that it is “actively working on other
listings and delistings and must determine and
publish a finding that such work has resulted in
pending proposals which actually preclude
proposing the petitioned action at that time,”
and “must determine and present evidence that
[it] is, in fact, making expeditious progress in
the process of listing and delisting other
species.”9 In the Frog Decision, the FWS failed
to make a determination regarding the expedi-
tious progress in listing or delisting other
species. The decision also failed to describe or
evaluate the data or reasons why the Frog was
precluded from listing, despite finding that
there are higher priority species precluding the
listing of the Frog.
The court found that this was not a situa-
tion in which the agency’s path may be reason-
ably discerned. Requisite determinations can-
not be absent from the decision when they are
referred to in the administrative record. Such
deficiencies in a “warranted but precluded”
decision cannot be cured with previous or sub-
sequent findings, regardless of whether they are
published, if they are not part of the adminis-
trative decision itself or published together
with it. The court was not able to review the
agency’s decision because the agency failed to
publish the documents upon which it relied. 
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision. The court of appeals held that the
Frog Decision failed to satisfy the requirements
set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B) for a “war-
ranted but precluded” finding. Because the
Frog Decision failed to satisfy the statutory
requirements, the court of appeals refused to
consider if the “warranted but precluded” deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious. The court did
not order the Frog to be listed, but only remand-
ed for further proceedings.
Endnotes
1.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii).
2.  Id.
3.  Review of Species That Are Candidates or
Proposed for Listing as Endangered or
Threatened; Annual Notice of Findings on
Recycled Petitions; Annual Description of
Progress on Listing Actions, 67 Fed. Reg.
40,657,  40,658 (June 13, 2002).  
4.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
5.  Id. §§ 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II).
6.  Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne,
466 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006).
7.  Id. at 1102.
8.   Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254
F.3d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 2001).
9.  Id. at 838. 
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Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 429
F. Supp. 2d 469 (D.P.R. May 2, 2006).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
In April 2006, Esso Oil Company began a reme-
diation project at the site of an old service sta-
tion in Puerto Rico. When residents filed suit
alleging that the project was causing widespread
health problems, the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted a
preliminary injunction, forcing the company to
stop the project. 
Background
The site of the old gas station had been contam-
inated by underground storage tanks that were
leaking in violation of several federal environ-
mental statutes, as well as Puerto Rico nuisance
and tort laws. To repair the damage, Esso
planned to drill more than thirty holes on the
contaminated land and to excavate the soil. The
remediation process would have taken approxi-
mately four months.
Soon after drilling began, residents of La
Vega Ward in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico, began
complaining of gasoline odors and reporting
dizziness, shortness of breath, nausea, and
headaches. An Esso representative was sent to
examine the complaints, but the company con-
tinued drilling for the next several days,
prompting more residents to seek medical care.
The residents sought a temporary restraining
order, which was converted to a request for a
preliminary injunction under Puerto Rico’s nui-
sance statute. 
Nuisance Statute
The district court noted that “a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief under the nuisance statue must
show that the activities being carried out by the
defendant, due to the manner in which they are
being carried out, transcend reasonable limits,
and therefore impose a burden that exceed[s]
that which he or she need bear.”1 In this case,
the court found that the residents presented
enough evidence to meet that test.
Several residents testified about the effect of
the odors on themselves and family members,
including children and the elderly. The resi-
dents were also able to introduce medical
records confirming their symptoms. Although
Esso claimed that the meter readings taken
from the site did not show levels of concern, the
court concluded that the company’s activities
constituted a nuisance, since the odors created
“an obnoxious condition which is highly dis-
tasteful.”2 Additionally, the court concluded
that since the excavation work would last for
four months, the harm to the residents could be
irreparable. The court granted the residents’
Oil Company Cleanup Halted
by Injunction
. . . the company filed
a motion to have 
privileged
evidence
returned 
that had
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due to an 
“errant mouse click.”
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preliminary injunction, and the company was
enjoined from further drilling activities.
Privileged Information
In July, the company filed a motion to have priv-
ileged evidence returned that had been inadver-
tently released to plaintiffs due to an “errant
mouse click.”3 The court denied the motion,
finding that the Esso waived its confidentiality
privilege. The court came to this conclusion by
using a “totality of the circumstances” test
which “holds that inadvertent disclosure only
constitutes a waiver if, in view of the totality of
the circumstances, adequate measures were not
taken to avoid the disclosure.” After examining
factors such as the reasonableness of the pre-
cautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclo-
sure, the amount of time it took the producing
party to recognize its error, the scope of the pro-
duction, the extent of the inadvertent disclo-
sure, and the overriding interest of fairness and
justice, the court held that the com-
pany had waived its confidentiality
privilege. 
New Evidence
In September, the oil company filed
a motion for reconsideration of the
injunction, claiming that the court
did not hear evidence at the injunc-
tion hearing that was subsequently
introduced by the company at anoth-
er hearing. The evidence included
documents with more technical
details of the excavation plan. The
court did not allow the introduction
of the evidence, since the company
had the opportunity to introduce the
evidence at the preliminary injunc-
tion hearing.
The company also argued that the
court should not have granted the
injunction, since the matter was
under the jurisdiction of the Puerto
Rico Environmental Quality Board
(PREQB). The court rejected that
argument, noting that the PREQB
did not take adequate action after residents
complained of health problems, there was a lack
of coherent state policy for such a situation, and
the agency did not object to the court’s proceed-
ings during the evidentiary hearing. 
Conclusion
The preliminary injunction enjoining the com-
pany from further drilling remains in effect,
since the district court denied the oil company’s
motions for reconsideration.
Endnotes
1.  Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
429 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (D.P.R. 2006).
2. Id. at 472-473. 
3. Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil
Company, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47738 at *6
(July 11, 2006). 
Photograph of clean-up machinery courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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In re Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77643 (D. Fla. Oct. 23,
2006).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida found that a
release signed by a parent on behalf of his son
did not exonerate a cruise company from liabil-
ity stemming from a wave runner accident. 
Background
During a cruise aboard the Sovereign of the Seas,
Keith Howard and his son, Mark, participated
in a day trip to Coco Cay, Bahamas. In Coco
Cay, the Howards signed up for a guided wave
runner tour led by Royal Caribbean Cruise
(RCC) employees. Before taking the trip, Keith
signed a waiver and release agreement for him-
self and Mark. The agreement contained lan-
guage releasing RCC from liability for any
injuries resulting from the use of the wave run-
ner. The agreement also contained a provision
that prohibited participants from operating the
watercraft within 100 yards of any shoreline. 
While touring Coco Cay on the wave runner,
the Howards crashed into an island. The
Howards and RCC each claimed different caus-
es of the accident. The Howards held the tour
leader responsible for the crash, alleging that he
led the group too close to the island, while RCC
pointed to the Howards’ failure to adhere to the
tour’s course and safety rules. It was unclear
whether Keith Howard’s failure to wear glasses
during the tour contributed to the accident. 
After the accident, Royal Caribbean brought
a claim for exoneration, citing the release agree-
ments signed by Keith Howard. The Howards
filed claims against the cruise line, which then
moved for summary judgment.
Waiver and Release
The court found that the release signed by Keith
Howard was clear and unambiguous—and
therefore enforceable. Keith Howard argued
that his release became invalid when the tour
Cruise Ship Liable for
Minor’s Claims
Photograph of cruise ships courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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leader took the group within 100 yards of the
shore, violating one of the provisions of the
release. The court rejected that claim, finding
that the release clearly stated the safety rule and
that when Howard signed the release, he agreed
to abide by its provisions, regardless of the tour
guide’s actions.
The court held that the release signed on
behalf of Mark was unenforceable. RCC cited
cases upholding parental releases; however, the
court distinguished that those releases involved
nonprofit community-based activities, not pri-
vate for-profit activities. 
Liability Claims
Since the court found the waiver and release
unenforceable against Mark, it examined his
liability claims against RCC. The court rejected
the claims Mark brought under the doctrine of
unseaworthiness. The court agreed with RCC
that the doctrine was limited to seamen and did
not extend to a ship’s passengers; therefore,
Mark’s claims of unseaworthiness had to be dis-
missed. The court did note that when examin-
ing the merits of Mark’s claims in a separate
exoneration proceeding, the court will examine
whether acts of negligence or conditions of
unseaworthiness caused the accident.
The Howards also claimed that a strict lia-
bility standard should govern the case, alleging
that riding wave runners is an ultra-hazardous
activity. The court, however, had already ruled
that a negligence standard would govern the
case. Mark also brought negligence claims
under Florida statutory law, but the court found
that Mark could not support those claims, since
the suit was governed by substantive general
maritime law. 
Conclusion
The district court granted summary judgment
to RCC with regard to Keith Howard’s claims,
but denied summary judgment with regard to
Mark Howard’s claims. The court will examine
the merit of Mark’s negligence claims in a sepa-
rate action.
Duty to warn
After the accident, Hodges filed a negligence
action against Summer Fun, alleging that its
employees had a duty to warn him of the haz-
ards of wake jumping. The District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington granted
summary judgment to the company, finding
that the dangers of wake jumping and operat-
ing a personal watercraft within 200 feet of
another vessel are open and obvious dangers
and that the company did not have a duty to
warn its customers.
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether
the dangers were in fact “open and obvious.”
The court adopted the definition of wake jump-
ing as “crossing a wake at such a speed that the
PWC will become airborne.”2 The court found
that no reasonable minds could differ as to
whether the dangers were open and obvious,
concluding that it should be apparent to a per-
son of ordinary intelligence that “…one might
fall off a PWC before, during or after jumping a
wake or collide with another vessel or collide
with another vessel while, during, or after jump-
ing a wake.”3
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Pregerson noted that “some
wake jumping is dangerous and some is not”
and that the obviousness of the danger depends
on the factual circumstances of each case.4 He
noted that in this case, the details of the events
leading up to the crash were unclear; therefore
the grant of summary judgment was in error.
Endnotes
1.  Hodges v. Summer Fun Rentals, Inc. 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25443 at *6 (9th Cir. Oct. 12,
2006).
2. Id. at *3. 
3.  Id. at *4-5. 
4. Id. at *10.
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remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit to
apply a test where “only those wetlands with a
continuous surface connection to bodies that
are waters of the United States in their own
right” are “adjacent to” such waters and cov-
ered by the CWA.2 Justice Kennedy, writing the
concurrence, viewed the “significant nexus”
test to be the proper test and “to constitute
‘navigable waters’ under the Act, a water or
wetland must possess a ‘significant nexus’ to
waters that are navigable in fact or could rea-
sonably be so made.”3 While the dissent dis-
agreed with the judgment and would have
given deference to the agency’s determination,
Justice Stevens noted that “all four justices who
have joined this [dissenting] opinion would
uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction… in all other
cases in which either the plurality’s or Justice
Kennedy’s test is satisfied…”4
When no clear majority exists, “the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”5 In
United States v. Gerke,6 the Seventh Circuit
equated the narrowest opinion with the one
least restrictive of federal authority to regulate.
But the Rapanos plurality deems it just as plau-
sible to conclude that the narrowest ground is
the ground most restrictive of government
authority “because that ground avoids the con-
stitutional issue of how far Congress can go in
asserting jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause.”7 The First Circuit settled on the idea
that the narrowest grounds are simply under-
stood as the “less far-reaching-common
ground.”8 Basically, the less sweeping opinion
would require the same outcome in a subset of
the cases that the more sweeping opinion
would.9 But this standard is still difficult to
apply to the facts of the Johnson case. In most
situations, Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test would be the least sweeping opinion.
But there may be circumstances when a body of
water has a slight “surface connection” to a nav-
igable waterway but no “significant nexus”
exists. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test would not be met but Justice
Stevens and the dissenters in Rapanos would
uphold jurisdiction because it met the plurali-
ty’s test. Essentially, “Justice Kennedy would
[be voting] against federal authority only to be
outvoted 8-to-1.”9
In order to provide for all circumstances
that may arise regarding the hydrological con-
nection between a wetland and navigable
waters, the First Circuit chose to follow Justice
Stevens’ dissent in Rapanos and apply either
the plurality’s “surface connection” test or
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. It chose not
to follow a sole opinion; but rather, find “com-
mon ground” shared by five or more justices.
By applying either test, the First Circuit will
ensure that federal jurisdiction exists such that
all of the Rapanos majority would have sup-
ported such a finding. Regardless of the test
applied, it would have the support of the four
dissenters plus the plurality or Justice
Kennedy. There will not be a situation where
Kennedy’s test is applied and no jurisdiction is
found even though a slight surface connection
exists and Kennedy would have been outvoted
by the plurality plus the dissent.
The First Circuit has remanded the Johnson
case to see if either the plurality’s “surface con-
nection” test or Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
test can be applied.
Endnotes 
1. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1352.
2.  Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,
2226 (2006).
3. Id. at 2236.
4. Id. at 2265.
5. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977).
6. 2006 WL 2707971 (7th Cir. 2006).
7.  United States v. Johnson, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27042, at *19 (1st Cir. 2006).
8.  Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga.,
263 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001).
9.  Johnson, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27042 at
*21.
10. Id. at *15.
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including members of Congress, state and local
government representatives, environmentalists,
recreational boaters, local businesses, and mem-
bers of the general public. 
While some of the comments showed strong
support for “the Coast Guard’s need to be
trained in order to carry out is law enforcement
and homeland security missions,” many
expressed concerns about the safety, notifica-
tion, and environmental impacts of the exercis-
es. The comments on public safety included
concerns about how far the bullets could travel
and whether they might ricochet off the surface
of the water. Some comments expressed concern
that small crafts and vessels without radio
access may not be notified that the live-fire
exercises were taking place. Other groups were
concerned that lead from the ammunition
would make its way into the public water sup-
ply. Several remarks also “raised concerns about
the number, size, and location of the proposed
safety zones and whether they would impede
recreational and commercial activity, including
tourism.”
Future Plans
Although the Coast Guard withdrew the
NPRM, it left open the possibility of a future
notice of proposed action for live fire exercises
in the Great Lakes, reasoning “[t]he Coast
Guard must be trained to meet all threats and
all hazards. In order to be proficient, the Coast
Guard must train in the maritime environment
in which it operates.” 
If the Coast Guard decided to pursue non-
emergency training exercises on the Great
Lakes it would publish a notice of its proposed
action, allow the public an opportunity to
comment, and publish a final rule. In the
meantime, members of Coast Guard boat
crews will complete their training outside of
the Great Lakes.
Photograph of Lake Superior's North Shore by Dave Hansen, courtesy of Great Lakes EPA.
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International Law Update
Below is a summary of the coastal and marine-related international law 
developments in 2006. 
Mexico Bans Marine-Animal Trade (January 2006)
Mexico has passed a law banning the import and export of marine mammals and primates, such
as whales, dolphins, sea lions, seals, and manatees, unless for scientific purposes. The law also
bans the import and export of products derived from marine mammals.
New Maritime Labour Convention (February 2006)
The International Labour Organization has adopted a new charter outlining rights for the nearly
1.2 million seafarers who work for the world’s shipping industry. The Convention contains pro-
visions such as conditions of employment, hours of work and rest, accommodation, medical care,
and health protection. A maritime labour certificate may now be issued to ships whose flag states
guarantee that the ships comply with the Convention. 
WTO Weighs in on U.S. Dumping Calculations (April 2006)
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body (AB) issued a report on the case filed by
the European Communities, “United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”).” The AB affirmed a panel report finding that the
zeroing methodology used by the U.S. in original antidumping investigations is inconsistent with
Article 2.42 in the WTO Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement. The AB reversed the panel’s finding
that the zeroing applications in the administrative review were not inconsistent with the AD
agreement. In May, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the both the Appellate Body report and
the amended panel report. 
Japan Loses Vote at Annual IWC Meeting (June 2006)
The International Whaling Commission’s annual meeting was held in the Caribbean state of St.
Kitts and Nevis. During the convention, Japan failed in its attempt to capture a majority vote on
several measures that would replace the current whaling moratorium with more relaxed regula-
tions for commercial whaling. 
Anti-Piracy Agreement Reached in Asia (September 2006)
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia entered into force, signifying the first intergovernmental agreement to encourage coopera-
tion against piracy and armed robbery. The Agreement contains provisions regarding information
sharing that will ensure the development of more effective prevention measures.
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2006 Federal Legislative Update
The following is a summary of federal legislation related to coastal, fisheries,
water, and natural resources enacted during 2006 by the 109th Congress. 
109 Public Law 226 – Coastal Barrier Resources Reauthorization Act of 2005 (S. 186)
Provides appropriations through the year 2010 for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to carry out
the Act. Requires the Secretary of the Interior to provide a report to Congress on the digital map-
ping pilot project in the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System units and other pro-
tected areas.
109 Public Law 234 – Michigan Lighthouse and Maritime Heritage Act (S. 1346) 
Provides for the creation of federal, state, and local partnerships to repair and preserve Michigan
lighthouses. Instructs the Interior Department to locate funding sources that will help commu-
nities implement protection measures. 
109 Public Law 241 – Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 (H.R. 889)
Authorizes appropriations for the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2006 and makes changes to other
laws administered by the Coast Guard, such as changing the limits of liability for vessels under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
109 Public Law 294 – Partners for Fish and Wildlife Act (S. 260)
Authorizes the Department of the Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Partners Program, to
provide technical and financial assistance to private landowners to restore, enhance, and manage
private lands to improve fish and wildlife habitats. 
109 Public Law 304 – Title 46, U.S. Code – Shipping (H.R. 1442) 
Codifies the uncodified portion of Title 46, U.S. Code – Shipping, except the portion regarding
the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act. 
109 Public Law 326 – Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act of 2006 (S. 2430)
Reauthorizes the Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Restoration Act, which was enacted in 1990 and
re-authorized in 1998. Implements recommendations in the Great Lakes Fishery Restoration
Study by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. 
See Federal, page 22
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part of the contract.”14 Under this instruction,
the real issue was whether the price promised to
be paid was the competitive bay price or the
posted price. Given all of the evidence, the jury
determined that ISA promised to pay the com-
petitive bay price.
Attorney’s Fees
Pursuant to Civil Rule 82, the prevailing party is
entitled to attorney’s fees.15 The fee award may be
adjusted at the judge’s discretion. Based on the
work performed and the benefit to ISA for having
a class action rather than the expense of multiple
trials, the trial court increased the attorney’s fees
by $15,000. ISA failed to establish that the trial
court abused its discretion through this increase,
so the trial court’s decision was upheld.
Conclusion
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed all of the
lower court’s rulings. As a result, ISA will be
required to pay fishers an additional $0.17 per
pound for salmon ISA bought in 2000 plus
attorney’s fees.
Endnotes
1.  International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v.
Bissonette, 2006 Alas. LEXIS 127 at *2
(Alaska Sept. 1, 2006). 
2. Id. at *2-3. 
3. Id. at *4. 
4. Id. at *7-8. 
5. Id. at *9. 
6. Id. at *10.
7. AK R. Civ. Pro., Rule 23.
8. International Seafoods of Alaska, 2006 Alas.
Lexis 127 at *18. 
9. Id. at *19. 
10. Id. at *24. 
11. Id. at *26. 
12. Id. at *32.
13. Id. at *32-33. 
14. Id. at *34-35 (emphasis omitted).
15. AK R. Civ. Pro., Rule 82.
109 Public Law 347 – Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (H.R. 4954)
Codifies the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the Container Security Initiative
programs. Modifies the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program to
require the timely issuance of TWIC cards to maritime employees. 
109 Public Law 360 – National Fish Hatchery System Volunteer Act of 2006 (H.R. 5381)
Authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to accept property, volunteer services, and funds donated
by nonfederal agencies for the benefit of the National Fish Hatchery System. 
109 Public Law 424 – Tsunami Warning and Education Act (H.R. 1674)
Expands current Pacific Tsunami Warning System through $159 million over five years.
Authorizes NOAA forecasting and warning system.
109 Public Law 449 – Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act (S. 362)
Establishes programs through NOAA to identify, reduce, and prevent marine debris. 
109 Public Law 479 – Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (H.R. 5946)
Reauthorizes the Act, includes amendments to improve monitoring and compliance for high seas
fisheries or fisheries governed by international fishery management agreements.
Federal, from page 21
Fishermen’s Class Action, from page 9
Volume 5, No. 4 The SandBar Page 23
Although it’s estimated that Minnesota has lost more than half of its original wetlands since the
mid-1800s, no one knows the exact number of remaining wetlands in the state and the rate at which
the wetlands are disappearing each year. To correct the deficiency, the Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources has developed a new plan to measure the number, quality, and loss rate of the
state’s wetlands. The $1.35 million project calls for mapping 4,990 randomly selected square-mile
plots over three years. The plan is intended to provide a comprehensive wetland assessment, mon-
itoring, and mapping strategy to help lawmakers and regulators make decisions regarding the
state’s wetlands. 
A district court judge dismissed an admiralty case filed by a tourist against her travel agent after
she was involved in a jet skiing accident in Mexico. The injured woman and her husband alleged
that the travel agent had a duty to warn them of the dangers of jet skiing in the waters of Mexico,
since it had mailed them a brochure advertising the trip.
When the crew of the Ybor City spotted a man aboard the barge it was towing, they assumed that
they had a stowaway and called the Coast Guard. Russell Bolton, in fact, was not a stowaway, but
had jumped onto the barge after his sail boat collided with the barge. The Coast Guard handcuffed
Bolton until they had assessed the situation, but later sent him to Jacksonville, Fla., on a rescue
boat. 
The Census of Marine Life has released its annual report,
which describes new undersea creatures discovered by scien-
tists in 2006. Nearly two-miles deep in the Atlantic, scientists
found shrimp living around a vent releasing near-boiling water
into the sea. Other surprising findings included the discovery
of a type of shrimp that were thought to be extinct, a fish school
the size of Manhattan located off the New Jersey shore, a four-
pound rock lobster off the coast of Madagascar, and a new
“furry” crab discovered near Easter Island. The census is sup-
ported by international governments, divisions of the United
Nations, and private conservation organizations. 
Around the Globe
In November, a homemade submarine carrying three tons of cocaine was seized while sailing 100
miles off the coast of Costa Rica’s Cabo Blanco National Park. The sub, which was traveling about
six feet beneath the surface, was detected by three plastic pipes moving through the water. The U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agents FBI, and Columbian officials aided Costa Rican
Authorities in capturing the four men in the sub. The 50-foot craft was constructed with wood and
fiberglass. Authorities estimated that the submarine probably had not traveled very far.
Photograph of single-celled eukaryotic microbe by L.
Amaral Zettler courtesy of The Census of Marine Life.
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